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Romantic is a word that only a few tour operators still dare to use without 
dreading the mixture of immediate boredom and polite condescension it is 
bound to be met with. That conventional response, however widespread 
today, is the symptom of a strange cultural amnesia, which accompanies the 
self-assuredness of a modernity whose belief in progress endows it with the 
implicit impression that the modern man in the street is necessarily more 
advanced or knows better, if perhaps not “more,” than any genius of the 
past. That this very belief is always preferably accompanied by its ironical 
denial, though, because it is in fact a typically Romantic attitude, may be 
taken as a hint that the issue is a little more complicated than the daily news 
has it. For it may be that the past haunts the present all the more powerfully 
because it has been defaced. Romanticism has been misrepresented in 
various ways over two centuries of literary and critical productions, and it 
has been either caricatured or recuperated to the point of being generally 
perceived today as the reverse of what it has been. But what has it been? 
Again, the general opinion is that it goes without saying. Yet it will go in 
different ways as soon as one starts trying to say, and in ways that vary 
considerably according to who is speaking, when and where. A brief 
international outing is enough to realise that Romanticism is understood 
differently, and conjures up different names and various ideas, as we cross 
the Channel, the Rhine, the Alps, or the Atlantic. The concept, incidentally, 
will hardly survive a voyage across the Mediterranean, unless the voyager is 
a Westerner whose romanticism resides in precisely this orientalistic 
tourism.  
Romanticism belongs to the History of the Western world. Yet reading 
the Romantics today, reading them as if for the first time, skipping prefaces 
and other framing critical discourses, with the eyes of a scholar trying 
honestly to make his own mind about these works of the past: such an 
experience is bound to come as a surprise. For the dominant impression, 
soon building up into a conviction, is that what one is reading is different 
from what one had expected. It is obviously more complex, and truly much 
more problematic. These poets are still alive and questioning, and their 
works offer compelling fields of research. It seems that they have acquired a 
new lisibilité in the second half of the twentieth century, as if what had 
seemed for a time a stale and has-been period of literature had now started 
literally making sense again. The wind may in fact have started turning with 
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The Romantic Agony (1956), when Mario Praz made the innovative critical 
demonstration that “there is no opposite pole to ‘romantic’,” and that 
“classicism, then, is by no means alien to the romantic spirit” [14]. This 
amounted to the realisation that Romanticism is neither a style nor a set of 
ideas or preferences, but the artistic expression of the openness of 
intellectual process, the exaltation of “the artist who does not give a material 
form to his dream.” The Romantic Agony is this essential Angst generated 
by the fact that Romantic art is a self-conscious illusion, realising itself as 
illusion. Praz’s discovery was Romantic precisely in as much as it was a 
liberation from binary thinking. This critical shift was confirmed and 
exemplified in the days of Deconstruction, with studies like those written by 
Paul de Man from the 1950s on, that were later gathered in The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism (1984), which contradicted the approach of so-called New 
Criticism that tended to see the great romantic texts as eternal monuments 
that reached to a canonical Empyrean above the historical contingences of 
their production. Under the pens of these Modern Frankensteins, the texts 
lived again, sometimes in rather shocking and apparently unnatural ways. 
Then, while Deconstruction had striven to shake the Romantic poems loose 
from internal closure, New Historicism restored them to their historical 
context, yet no longer merely to read them as reflectors of their times, but in 
ways that showed how they too cast a new light on their historical epochs 
and perhaps even proved them to have played no negligible part in shaping 
the History of ideas. One exemplary work among many others in this vein is 
no doubt Jerome McGann’s The Romantic Ideology (1983), which 
demonstrates how much twentieth-century academic and critical responses 
to Romantic poetry is still dominated, more or less consciously, by ideas and 
beliefs that are the produce or the inheritance of Romanticism. One case in 
point, in this respect, is Harold Bloom’s deservedly successful Romantic 
critical reading of the Romantics. 
This new readability of the Romantics, in its various guises, amounts 
to the realisation that their key preoccupations had surprising 
correspondences with those of modern and post-modern times. Naturally, 
this may be the result of an optical illusion, easily explained away as a 
projection of the critic’s ideas onto the studied object. After all, this is the 
romantic vice of empathy, which Keats had been guilty of with Spencer, or 
Hazlitt with Shakespeare. But another way of looking at the same 
phenomenon would consist in saying that this shows the virtue of the 
ancestors, as John Joughin does in The New Aestheticism (2003), considering 
that the greatness of a literary text of the past is measurable to its capacity to 
resist critical interpretation and to keep generating new readings. This 
generative remainder would then testify to the remanence of a literary work. 
But the remanence of Romanticism is of another order, for it cannot be 
convincingly put down to the individual genius of one or several authors, be 
it only because there was indeed a plethora of Romantic poets of unequal 
merits, who were, in fact, very far from sharing any clearly discernible 
common set of opinions or values. Remanent Romanticism may be 
accounted for by the realisation that the Romantic period is a chapter in a 
long-lasting epistemological narrative. Romanticism cannot satisfactorily be 
envisaged as a transitory moment of rupture in the supposedly linear 
continuum of literary history, any more than Modernism or the Renaissance 
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can. The concept of Revolution, if it was not so heavily fraught with political 
resonances, would perhaps provide a useful conceptual tool because of the 
recurrence it implies. For indeed Romanticism has been seen as the literary 
form of the eighteenth-century Revolutions in America and in Europe. And 
so it is possible to view the Romantic moment as the climax—or merely the 
peripeteia, the instant of reversal—in a huge tragic plot that would have its 
exposition in the days of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and reach its 
dénouement in the Modernist and Postmodernist age. It is certainly no 
coincidence that the other moment of literary history, apart from the 
Romantic period, and indeed the first to have been revisited by New 
Historicist criticism is the “early-modern” period, thus reconceptualised in 
the wake of Stephen Greenblatt’s work. 
This diachronic perspective is not new, and it would tend to 
corroborate T.S. Eliot’s theory of a “dissociation of sensibility,” that he 
situated “in the seventeenth century” and from which, he said, “we have 
never recovered.” This vision of literary history is most famously broached 
in T.S. Eliot’s 1921 essay on “The Metaphysical Poets” but would later be 
resumed in his 1936 essays on Milton, in which he acknowledged being 
indebted for this phrase to E.M.W. Tillyard. In the same occasion, he 
confessed that “to lay the burden on the shoulders of Milton and Dryden 
was a mistake,” adding that “it is a consequence of the same causes that 
brought about the Civil War,” and “that we must seek the causes in Europe, 
not in England alone” [266]. This ideological and epistemological problem 
would then concern the Mind of Europe rather than simply the “mind of 
England,” and it would be closely related indeed to the English Revolutions. 
In his earlier essay, however, T.S. Eliot remarked that a first tremor towards 
the beginning of a solution might be felt in two of the very last great poems 
of the High Romantic period: “In one or two passages of Shelley’s Triumph of 
Life, in the second Hyperion there are traces of a struggle toward unification 
of sensibility.” The process, however, was then brutally interrupted because, 
he added, “Keats and Shelley died, and Tennyson and Browning 
ruminated” [65]. It is tempting to deduce from this the hypothesis that 
T.S. Eliot’s poetical agenda may be tentatively defined in terms of this 
“unification of sensibility.” And this would entail that there is no radical 
solution of continuity between the Modernism of Eliot and the Romanticism 
of Shelley and Keats, but that both movements inscribe themselves in one 
and the same teleological aspiration. It should also be noted in passing that 
this project of a reconciliation, or an overcoming, of the divorce between 
“thought” and “feeling” is very similar to the invention by the Jena 
Romantics of Literature as a hybrid of Philosophy and Poetry. The dream of 
a Socrates having “learnt the art” and become a musician-philosopher 
would be dear to Nietzsche, whose apophtegmatic thinking, like much of 
Modernist “difficulty” or “raid on the inarticulate,” and for example Eliot’s 
Waste land once composed from a longer text of his by Pound, have for 
precursors the many-authored Romantic fragments of the Athenaeum and the 
Lyceum, brothers in incomplete openness to Shelley’s Triumph of Life and 
Keat’s Hyperion and Fall of Hyperion. 
An endorsement and continuation of the same principle, as if it were a 
matter of fact never to be questioned, may be witnessed in Pound, when he 
compliments Keats for having “got so far as to see” that poetry “need not be 
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the pack-mule of philosophy” [292]. But one is allowed to wonder whether 
Pound himself went that much further than carrying out to an exacerbated 
form of expression an idea of literature, beyond both poetry and philosophy, 
that had in fact already been invented more than a century before in 
Germany. It is difficult not to perceive Pound’s calculated insolence, 
histrionic bravadoes and impressive obscurities as a spectral case of 
revisited Byronism. George Gordon had his “little pagoda” and 
scandalously worshipped a statuette of Buonaparte in Harrow, although he 
would later trample even this idol underfoot to stand alone, incestuous, 
nearly Sadian, and as Lady Caroline Lamb would eagerly say: “mad, bad 
and dangerous to know.” In very comparable manner, Pound’s obstinate 
fascism operates for a large part like Byron’s Satanism; it is the guarantee of 
an unforgettably bad character, in voluntary exile from his own nation 
deemed unworthy of him. True, Pound will vituperate pell-mell “bad Keats; 
the romantics, Swinburne, Browningese, neo-celticism” [287]. But this often 
reiterated kind of intoxicated imprecation has the main function of conjuring 
up a nebula of contraries against whom to define his own persona by defect. 
Thus Byron proclaimed himself a radical anti-romantic, in much the same 
tone, writing “Thou shalt not set up Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey; / 
Because the first is crazed beyond all hope, / The second drunk, the third so 
quaint and mouthy” [Don Juan I. ccv]. For it is striking how anti-
Romanticism is one of the chief characteristics of the English Romantics 
themselves. Byron refused to read Wordsworth until very late, or so he said, 
and merely to humour his good friend “Shiloh” and then only with much 
professed disgust. Mary Shelley, having read a few stanzas of Wordsworth’s 
poem “The Excursion” with her husband, allegedly dropped the book and 
sadly exclaimed: “He is a slave!” As for “Jack Keats or Ketch, or whatever 
his names are,” Byron wrote to his publisher Murray from Ravenna, “such 
writing is a sort of mental masturbation–f-gg-g his Imagination” [4 
November 1820]. Mawkish Romantic language, indeed. 
Wordsworth famously refused to drink Keats’s toast at Haydon’s 
“Immortal Dinner,” when the younger poet proposed “Confusion to the 
memory of Newton.” Apart from sheer incompatibility of temperament, the 
anecdote was symptomatic of a much deeper disagreement between these 
two Romantic poets, which Keats expressed elsewhere no less famously by 
radically distinguishing “the poetical Character itself (I mean that sort of 
which, if I am any thing, I am a Member” from “the Wordsworthian or 
egotistical sublime.” And by this mere assertion, made in a letter to 
R. Woodhouse of 27 October 1818, Keats did more than voice antipathy for 
an older poet, but hit upon a discovery that is essential to any genuine 
understanding of English Romantic poetry, and which would only come to 
be fully understood more than a century later. Keats’s symbolic indictment 
of Newton, “because he destroyed the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it 
to a prism,” is an idea that he inherited from Blake, but which is a precursor 
of Eliot’s early putting the blame of the dissociation of sensibility on Milton 
and Dryden. For reasons that would require a much longer study to fully 
demonstrate, this radical rejection of empiricism and its subject/object 
dichotomy is coterminous with T.S. Eliot’s “impersonal theory of poetry,” 
and his plea for “a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality” is a rediscovery of Keats’s principle that “A Poet is the most 
 Joanny Moulin  /  5 
 
unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no identity.” Eliot’s 
“catalyst” is a revision of Keats’s “cameleon Poet.” The choice of a chemical 
metaphor operates de facto as an implicit tribute to the apothecary poet, who 
considered that “Men of Genius are great as certain ethereal Chemicals 
operating on the Mass of neutral intellect—but they have not any 
individuality” [Letter to Bailey 22 November 1817]. 
Keats’s major poetic efforts were attempts to come to terms with this 
essentially Modern problem of the Self. The misunderstood, and scarcely 
ever read Endymion was already a mythopoetic journey beyond the 
“thoughts of self.” Hyperion was an allegorical effort to express an 
irreversible historical change in the human Mind, abruptly given up because 
“there were too many Miltonic inversions in it” [Letter to Reynolds 21 
September 1819]. The Fall of Hyperion was the second try of the same 
endeavor, in which T.S. Eliot would later perceive “traces of a struggle 
toward unification of sensibility.” Keats’s achievement, misread or 
altogether ignored though it has always been except by Shelley, was the 
fulgurating anticipated intuition of the “decentering of the self” and “demise 
of the subject” that would only much later be considered an essential 
characteristic of Modernism. But Keats lived in unripe times that were 
unable to understand him properly and he died much too young. His 
Victorian successors, chief among whom Tennyson, cultivated a blue-
stocking admiration for superficial side-aspects of his poetry, his quaint 
medievalism, sublimated sexuality and conservative infatuation with the 
English language. This indebtedness of Modernist poetry to the brave 
pioneering work of Keats has almost never been acknowledged, except by 
the American poets of the so-called “Black Mountain” group, namely 
Robert Duncan, Robert Creeley, and chiefly Charles Olson who believed that 
with his “Negative Capability” Keats had “put across the century the inch of 
steel to wreck Hegel.” Olson recognized Keats as the inventor of what he 
called “Projective Verse,” defined as the continuation of “the work of Pound 
& Williams” [239], that is to say exactly the contrary of “the Egotistical 
Sublime.” 
These preoccupations of Keats’s naturally did not come out of the blue, 
but were in the air of the radical literary and artistic milieu he more than 
mixed with, around William Hazlitt or Leigh Hunt and the “Cockneys.” 
They were part of what Pound would later call the Paideuma, the “gristly 
roots of ideas” that were incipiently in action in his own time. Further 
research might demonstrate their close theoretical relation to the 
philosophical grounds of the 1810 quarrel between Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. The private reasons are well-known enough, but there may have 
been a deeper rift, which is in fact the dynamic apple of discord that 
actuated the whole English Romantic movement, and which may be 
considered for short as being potentially contained in one sentence from a 
1815 letter to Wordsworth: “Life begins in detachment from Nature and 
ends in unition with God.” It was already more than intimated as early as 
1802 by one line from “Dejection, An Ode”: “And in our life alone does 
nature live.” Very shortly after Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge in fact stopped 
being what the twentieth-century would soon call a “Nature poet,” and 
perhaps never really was. This was a crucial departure. After Göttingen, 
where Wordsworth had followed him to write his Rousseauist, egotistical 
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masterpiece The Prelude—that he would never publish in its original 1805 
version, but only thirty years later after a total revision—Coleridge’s Kantian 
and post-Kantian meditations would make him one of the foremost 
Romantic literary figures in the Europe of his own time, if certainly not one 
of the most prolix poets. There is in his philosophy and poetry a resolute 
departure from the Wordsworthian fascination for “the sum of all that is 
merely Objective,” and which Coleridge will equate to “Nature,” thus 
“confining the term to its passive and material sense” [I 174]. This enabled 
him to define “the Self or Intelligence” as being “in necessary antithesis” to 
Nature. The difficulty of Coleridge’s thought resides in the fact that he is not 
speaking of the old, pre-Kantian and pre-Romantic empirical subject, but of 
a transcendental self that he envisions as the seat of Imagination, “an 
intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive” [I 124-25]. 
How this innovative concept relates to Keats’s “Negative Capability,” 
for instance, is not too difficult to perceive, neither is its relation to the twin 
notions of Romantic Irony and Romantic Agony. In each of those various 
forms of expression, Coleridge’s Imagination is the principle of Newness, 
this radical, anguishing, potentially self-destructive power of solo avant-
garde creation that defines the essence of pure Genius. It is, however, much 
less straightforwardly realised that Coleridge’s Imagination is the prototype 
of Pound’s Vortex, which is the image reconsidered, no longer as idea, but as 
“a radiant node or cluster […] from which, and through which, and into 
which, ideas are constantly rushing” (1914). There is in fact no difference of 
nature between these concepts, but merely a different degree of 
“concentration” or hardness. When Pound incriminates “a dough-like state 
of reception” and “a fashion of passivity that has held since the romantic 
movement” [433-34], he is simply not up to Coleridge’s intellectual 
standard, for he is writing rather in the manner of the ideologist than in that 
of the philosopher. In this case his small-R epithet “romantic” incidentally 
happens to refer chiefly to Impressionism and the various artistic fashions 
“since” the romantic movement. Pound is here striving to define Vorticism 
as against Impressionism, and, more loosely speaking, modernism as against 
romanticism, while more or less deliberately posing as the inventor of ideas 
that he was reanimating from a forgotten past. However, the quarrel that he 
is here engaging into with his immediate Impressionist predecessors bears 
great similarities to Coleridge’s disagreement with Wordsworth. It pertains 
to the same effort, albeit stronger and more successful, to wrench free from 
idealism. The imprecatory style so characteristic of Pound, as well as of 
Nietzsche, is the symptom that, in the Christian civilisation of the Western 
world, this cannot be done without breaking a taboo, which Coleridge was 
still strongly brow-beaten by. 
Pound’s critical discourse, together with Eliot’s, is responsible for much 
of the subsequent critical dereliction of Romanticism, thus assimilated with 
its post-romantic misreadings and variants. In terms of poetic discourse and 
in the history of literary criticism, Modernism has upstaged Romanticism, at 
a time when America was vying for cultural leadership, in the wake of its 
then recently acquired economical and military hegemony. In an American 
context, however, and for American Modernists faced with the necessity of 
emerging from the background of their own literary tradition, the great 
“Romantic” Father figures were Whitman and Emerson. After the event, in 
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the unavoidable simplification that accompanies any stock taking, these 
names respectively epitomise the two key issues of the Self and 
Transcendence. Modernism, supposedly reaching its most accomplished 
destiny in Post-modernism, is most often characterised by a “de-centring” of 
the Self and a departure from metaphysical Transcendence. Eliot’s 
Anglicanism, Royalism and Classicism would then have to be passed off as a 
symptom of incomplete development. But his denigration of Shelley as 
immature which, he confessed, was a reaction against “an invasion of his 
adolescent self by Shelley,” is also the expression of a radical ideological 
opposition to Shelley’s left-wing activism and atheism. For the author of The 
Necessity of Atheism was just as much the grandson of Voltaire as Eliot was 
the spiritual heir to the author of The Genius of Christianity. The authors of 
“The Mask of Anarchy,” “Peter Bell the Third,” or “Written in Disgust of 
Vulgar Superstition” are just as ‘reactionary’ as the leading modernist 
figures were ‘progressive’: hardly so at all.  
Indeed, there is a strange contradiction between Romanticism and 
some Modernist and Post-modernist representations of Romanticism, not 
least when it comes to the issue of metaphysics. T.E. Hulme once famously 
declared that Romanticism was “spilt religion,” thus contributing to the 
convenient simplification that amounts to considering Romanticism, on the 
whole, as a transitory and hopeless reactionary attempt to reassert the 
metaphysical, at a historical moment when the Enlightenment came to grief. 
In this respect, Romanticism is an early interpretation of the epistemological 
shift inaugurated by Kant, amounting to an effort to promote poetry to the 
societal and cultural function of a kind of surrogate for religion. This is 
undeniably true, but only partly true. Wordsworth and his pantheistic 
“presence” is the archetype of the metaphysical Romantic, later relayed from 
Tennyson to Hopkins, and from Dylan Thomas to Ted Hughes and Seamus 
Heaney, throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth century. In so far as 
Coleridge tended to reduce his intuition of Imagination to “a repetition in 
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” [I, 183], he 
fell in the category of what Deconstructionists would call “logocentrism,” 
defined by Derrida as the “metaphysics of presence” and the belief in, or the 
desire for, a “transcendental signifier.” But this other epistemological shift, 
however, cannot be considered as a sure shibboleth to tell Romanticism from 
Modernism, for it took place already within the Romantic movement. For, 
reciprocally, in equating human Imagination to “the infinite I AM,” 
Coleridge implicitly intuited the constructed nature of transcendence.  
The same questioning of the metaphysics of presence is also the 
central topic of one of the texts that Eliot singled out as forerunners of his 
“unification of sensibility,” Shelley’s Triumph of Life, where the 
Wordsworthian type of the Romantics of presence is represented by the 
character called Rousseau, a parody of Dante’s Virgil, who pathetically 
confesses that his vision of Nature was a mistake. The spirit of Rousseau met 
in Hades explains to Shelley that when he died he was made to undergo 
what he had preached and to drink from the cup of Nature, like Socrates 
hemlock—“Touched with faint lips the cup she raised, / And suddenly my 
brain became as sand” [405]. Shelley, and Keats, committed the capital sin of 
dying in their youth, and suffered the retribution of being read in the light of 
their early Platonic idealism. Yet the later parts of their works show signs of 
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considerable striving towards a new horizon, and the fragmentary quality of 
Shelley’s Triumph of Life as well as of Keats’s Hyperion and Fall of Hyperion is 
the ancestor of Modernist collage and montage; their self-destructive silence 
is the cipher of Modernist difficulty. Shelley’s Demogorgon, the spirit that 
slays Jupiter in Prometheus Unbound, or Keats’s Moneta, the Monetary 
Goddess in The Fall of Hyperion, are allegories of Necessity and the 
unavoidability of change, that render possible early poetic dramatisations of 
the Modernist process without a subject. This anti-Romantic Romanticism 
that makes them turn their backs on the Lakists of the first generation is a re-
enactment and a confirmation of Blake’s rejection of Swedenborg. For these 
sons of Blake, the “transcendental signifier” is already irremediably 
hypostasised in History and the transitory Mind of mankind: “God only 
Acts & Is in existing beings of Men.” Moreover, the reiterated abruption that 
characterises their unfinished poems seems to dramatise the conviction 
expressed by Hegel in his Aesthetics that art has an “after” as well as a 
“before,” and to be the announcement of a time “when art points beyond 
itself” [103]. 
Coming by definition after what Hegel foresaw as “the end of the 
romantic form of art” and existing therefore supposedly “above ideas and 
consecrated forms,” literary Modernism seems nevertheless predominantly 
an American and an English phenomenon. It may be that it is perceived as 
having universal relevance perhaps only because the English language has 
been that of the dominant culture in the twentieth century. Much in the 
same way, Romanticism appears to have found its first and clearest 
expression in German and English letters. America and France, the most 
conspicuous homelands of the eighteenth-century revolutions, had only 
afforded second-hand and therefore historically provincial expressions of 
Romanticism; Whitman and Hugo no doubt count among the greatest of 
poets, but they are post-romantic poets and belong to an altogether different 
historical context. In France, to this day, the reception of Romanticism has 
been conditioned by what Marx and Engels called the “French Ideology,” 
the anti-religious, socialist rationalism inherited from the Enlightenment. 
Chateaubriand, Lamartine and Vigny having done their best to serve as 
brilliant examples to consolidate the popular opinion that Romantique always 
more or less refers to those reactionary “Royalists,” this “band of Emigrants 
in Arms / Upon the borders of the Rhine, [and] leagued / With foreign Foes 
mustered for instant war” that Wordsworth, in his Prelude [IX 185], 
confessed to having consorted with.  
Because of these peculiar historical circumstances, the essential 
aesthetic and ideological issues of ‘high’ Romanticism—as opposed to its 
downstream, postromantic rumination—have erupted on the French literary 
and artistic stage in the manner of a long-fused time bomb, under the 
species of Surrealism. It is no mere coincidence that, on the one hand, the 
Surrealist Revolution was the exact contemporary of Modernism, while, on 
the other hand, it paralleled the October Revolution and entertained with 
Communism a lasting love-hate relationship. A professed successor of 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Lautréamont, and Sade, but also of Hugo (“quand il 
n’est pas bête”) along with Chateaubriand (“dans l’exotisme”) [38-39] to quote 
but a few in a very severely selected list of names, Breton solemnly declared 
Surrealism to be “historically” the “tail” of Romanticism, and more precisely 
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its “prehensile tail” [110]. He considered that the true essence of 
Romanticism “resided entirely in the negation” of what so-called 
romanticism the French authorities were celebrating the centennial 
anniversary of in 1930, adding on top of the bargain that Surrealism was still 
but the youth and infancy of Romanticism. Remarkably, however, beyond 
the sheer preposterous exuberance of a style that was part and parcel of the 
Zeitgeist, several of the key grounds on which Surrealism may be defined as 
a recurrence or Romanticism are indeed the same as those on which it 
coincides with Modernism. Pound’s invention of Imagist Vortex as a 
liberation of the image from the idea is very much the same thing as the 
Surrealistic “spark,” destined to “do away with idealism proper” and to 
literally destroy the idea—“torpiller l’idée” [117]. Automatic writing, being 
the methodical main road to “distraction,” in application of the “soluble 
fish” principle according to which “man is soluble in his own thinking” [55], 
is nothing but a creative acting out of the demise of the subject. Yet this new 
approach to art is explicitly perceived as the possibility for “the imagination 
of man to take a blatant revenge on everything” after “centuries of 
domestication of the spirit and mad resignation” [135]. Surrealism reasserts 
and revisits Coleridge’s Imagination, Hegel’s Einbildungskraft. Surreality, 
defined as the “resolution of these two states, apparently so contradictory, of 
dream and reality,” may easily be understood as an avatar of Eliot’s 
“unification of sensibility,” which is also a revision of the Jena Romantics’ 
project of a marriage of philosophy and poetry, or, as Breton would say, the 
wish that Philosophy be superseded—“que la philosophie soit surclassée” [97]. 
Modernists and Surrealists, however, have carefully ignored one 
another, and in spite of the effort of poor David Gascoyne the Surrealist 
Revolution never made its way across the Channel. Unlike Buonaparte, 
though, it never even bothered to try its luck. This is perhaps due to an 
English version of what Marx called the “German Ideology,” this almost 
natural inclination to sympathise with the “romantic enemies of reason,” as 
Adorno and Horkeimer would say to characterise an agenda which 
precisely was also theirs. In the English context, therefore, Surrealism was 
simply bringing some untranslatable water to an already well-powered mill. 
But it has found an important echo on the other side of the Atlantic, for 
historical reasons that are most likely to have absolutely nothing to do with 
Breton’s short stay in the United States of America and in Haiti during the 
second World War. The often recognised affinity that can be seen between 
the intellectual heritage of Surrealism and Postmodern American poets as 
various as John Ashbery, “deep image” poet Robert Bly or the 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E and so-called Innovative poets is the result of 
Pound’s influence, but also came indirectly via the Fine Arts.  
Yet, whereas the intellectual lineage of this tradition requires some 
amount of demonstration, at least one direct Romantic remanence in 
twentieth-century American poetry may be witnessed in the new-style 
lyricism and orientalism of the Beats, and especially in Ginsberg’s overt 
adoption of Whitman as a role model. In such a case, however, the 
Romanticism is at once more patent and much more independent of 
intellectualistic, theoretical preoccupations. Robert Lowell may almost too 
easily be called Romantic for both his early political commitment and his 
later confessional style. A similar remark could be made concerning the 
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indebtedness of “eco-poets” to Wordworthian Romanticism, and the crypto-
Byronism of Rock’n Roll singers. But these domains, of which examples can 
be found world-wide, seem to call for research that belongs to the field of 
cultural studies even more than to literary criticism stricto sensu. Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy once declared that “The Romantics have no 
predecessors” [42]. While this remains to be discussed, it seems beyond 
doubt that they do have successors, not least obviously among those who 
repudiate them or refuse to acknowledge the debt. What is more, these 
modern continuators of the Romantics need not necessarily be considered as 
reactionary anti-modernists. But quite the contrary, although it had been 
argued before, it seemed necessary to recall that Modernism itself may to a 
large extent be interpreted as a continuation of the Romantic agenda by 
other means.  
 
* * * 
 
In “We are All German Romantics,” Jacques Darras begins by 
returning to Dante, thus broadening the angle of vision to perceive the 
Romantic moment, which originated in the German Romantic movement of 
Jena, as situated midway, “nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita,” in the history 
of modern Europe. The most desirable future for Europe, he argues, a future 
that would turn it back on the barbarity of the twentieth century, lies in the 
direction pointed out by Romanticism. Such a statement, however, cannot be 
the object of a debate, in which Jacques Darras finds himself in polite 
disagreement with French modernist poet Michel Deguy, for instance, 
although it is in fact the effect of as yet imperfect mutual understanding. 
Darras writes as a man of letters, and his essay, by echoing the 
preoccupations of contemporary philosophers like Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, testifies to the persistent relevance of a debate on 
the reception of Romanticism. 
“Romanticism and Postromanticism; from Wordsworth to Pater,” by 
René Gallet, explores and maps the long intermediary period of Victorian 
poetry, that stretches between the Romantic and the Modernist moments, 
which are traditionally perceived as two historically distinct periods. But 
Gallet’s wide-ranging culture goes far into revealing the philosophical and 
theological intricacies of a time that is a long pondering over the 
consequences of the epistemological shift tolled by Kant in the twilight of 
the Enlightenment. While operating a salutary critical revisiting of a period 
that the Modernist ideology had made to appear rather like a loose, baggy 
parenthesis, Gallet also demonstrates how this particular debate cannot be 
convincingly conducted without paying due attention to the Reformation, in 
which it has its roots. 
In “Also F.H. Bradley: An Hegelian Reading of T.S. Eliot’s Negativity,” 
Brian Glaser starts by paying special attention to the conclusions of 
T.S. Eliot’s doctoral dissertation on English philosopher F.H. Bradley, who 
was both a leading figure of English idealism and a detractor of Hegel’s 
philosophy, to which Eliot was introduced when he was a student of George 
Santayana’s. Glaser applies to Eliot a critical method inspired from Hegel’s 
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commentary of Diderot’s Nephew of Rameau, to argue that the alleged 
newness of modernist poetry is in fact less an epochal rupture than a second 
generation of attempts at thinking the self in terms of cultural construction. 
In “Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams’s Romantic Dilemmas: 
from Obliteration to Remanence,” Hélène Aji reconsiders Pound’s 
repudiation of Romanticism, especially in the person of Whitman, in the 
light of his more ambiguous relation to the poetry of Browning. For all the 
apparent rejection of the Romantic, the dream of founding Modernism on a 
historical tabula rasa soon proves a re-enactment of Romantic agony. In a 
comparable way, but without the same categorical claim to rejection, 
Williams’s attitude to Keats is one of liberation through appropriation and 
adaptation. Aji thus shows how, in spite of proclaimed rejection, the 
Romantic projects can be seen to be actualised in Modernist poetics, 
precisely in terms of this force of rupture that characterises Modernist 
writing. 
Sara Greaves, in “A poetics of dwelling in Basil Bunting’s Briggflatts,” 
turns to the case in point of Bunting, a British poet who managed the tour de 
force of reconciling Poundian Modernism with Wordsworthian 
Romanticism. Greaves reads Bunting as an early example of what critics like 
Johnathan Bate or Leonard Scigaj have called “ecopoetry,” which marries 
modernist techniques with a Romantic discourse that favours the 
connectedness of man with nature. American poets like Gary Snyder or 
M.S. Merwin, English poets like Ted Hughes or Ruth Fainlight, are examples 
of a branch of post-modern literary expression of Green sensibility, which is 
often related to Beat or New Age ideology. Far from being only a case of 
sheer instrumentalisation, it is also the development and exploration of post-
empirical, non-Cartesian modes of subjectivity. At the same time, it testifies 
to a belief in the transformational power of poetry which the Modernists 
shared with the Romantics.  
In “Romanticism and Animism in Roy Fisher’s A Furnace,” William 
Wootten reads Fisher’s poetry in the light of John Cowper Powys’s concept 
of “fetish,” which is not the same as Freud’s, but designates an image or icon 
that facilitates quasi epiphanic moments of entry into nature. These fetishes 
operate like means of escaping the symbolic order and may be related to 
Kristeva’s notion of “the semiotic,” of the concept of chora that she borrows 
from Plato. Yet Wootten engages in a critical argument with Andrew 
Crozier, whose “post-structuralist sensibilities” he antagonizes, thus giving 
an illustration of a lasting debate, of which what is sometimes called the 
theory war has recently offered a rich series of examples. The bone of 
contention is really the metaphysical issue—often regarded as the fault-line 
between Romanticism and Modernism, but which, we have argued, may 
rather be analysed as already inherent to the Romantic ideology—of which 
this article demonstrates the lasting relevance to this day. 
 With “The Ballad Revisited: Elizabeth Bishop’s ‘The Burglar of 
Babylon’,” Axel Nesme affords a sturdy if indirect post-structuralist 
response. Yet the divergence of analyses is only apparent, and more a matter 
of method than of meaning. The radically close text analysis, and the 
seemingly shallow pretext of working on a ballad composed by a poet who 
once playfully called herself “a minor female Wordsworth,” should not 
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mask the fact that Nesme is here working in depth on the crucial problem of 
mimesis, and has subtly chosen a poet whose canonical raison d’être is 
precisely her constant toeing of the line of departure from 
Transcendentalism. He shows what may well be Bishop’s greatest literary 
worth: that her distanciated meditation on the gaze of the observer in the act 
of perception—but this for the very perceptive reader’s eyes only—is an 
intellectualised revisiting of Romantic Irony or, in other words, of 
Coleridge’s decisive step ahead of Wordsworth. The way Nesme makes use 
of the theoretical tools of Lacan and Zizek will demonstrate, if need be, that 
there is no unbridgeable gap between post-structuralism and the inchoative 
Romantic departure from idealism, but merely some historical distance and 
increased degree. 
In “Ted Hughes & Romanticism: A Poetry of Desolation & 
Difference,” Janne Stigen-Drangsholt brings to contribution Heidegger, 
whose philosophy simply could not be dispensed with on such a topic, and 
especially his Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. She very convincingly argues 
that it would be wrong to read Ted Hughes simply as a neo-Romantic, 
although he is one of the most eminent continuators of the Romantic 
endeavour. Stigen-Drangsholt argues that myth, in Hughes’s poetry, is in no 
way exterior to the poetic expression, but that it is essentially an openness, 
an opening of a “between” within which there can be a “relation” of subject 
to “object,” or a space where what Heidegger would term Being is brought 
to language. In agreement with Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, she further 
adds that this is also Schelling’s conception of myth as non-mimetic and 
transcending the binary mode of our perception of the world. 
These essays on Remanent Romanticism concur to a project in literary 
criticism that calls for a kind of diachronical comparative criticism, of which 
they offer various tentative examples. They call for further research in 
philosophy and the history of ideas and of art, that reach beyond the mere 
scope of what is traditionally the limited provinces and prescribed 
behaviours of literary studies. By doing so, they take the risk of cross-
country walks onto the forbidden lawns and into the thickets that stretch 
appealingly between the well-trodden academic paths. They do not amount 
to any sort of exhaustive statement but mean to raise questions, and rather 
aim at providing a short, open-ended series of other critical directions. 
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